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I came to the law as a woman, and as a woman of the sixties,
and I am looking for a place in the eighties, which unfortunately
seems to be a time of consumerism, of ambitious, individualistic,
post-feminist women. At least, that is the picture that the media
paints, though it is often, I think, a false picture. Still, I am very
concerned about the world, including the world of legal academia.
Oppression and exploitation still exist. Some of us have participated
in it, many of us have benefitted from it, and all of us have
permitted it to continue to exist.
It seems to me that the two most powerful forces in the world
right now are not electromagnetism or gravity; they are inertia and
the fear of being made a fool of in public. These forces keep a lot
of us going along the same old paths. In the area of law, those
paths are false to reality. For one thing, they are essentially male,
partly because the world of law, in a time some of us can remember,
was as male as football.
Fortunately, there is a countervailing force to inertia and a
fear of embarrassment: the thirst for justice. It was the impetus
for this symposium; it was the impetus which propelled many of
us into law. I hope that the four of us, by speaking here today,
can help reinforce that thirst for justice.
What I am going to talk about today is teaching substantive
law. I am going to talk primarily about what gets taught, and
secondarily, about how it gets taught, although obviously it is very
hard to separate the two. I am going to assume that the audience
I have is a group of well-meaning, well-intentioned students and
faculty who need only to have their thirst for justice whetted. I
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recognize that, at least as to the faculty, it is also an audience that
is overwhelmingly male, as it is at most institutions. I refuse to
accept, however, that biology is destiny for men any more than
for women. There is no biological barrier to good behavior. My
talk is directed in the first instance to faculty, but I will suggest
some strategies that students might use if faculty members don't
get the message.
In proposing a gender-sensitive approach to teaching, I have
three levels of concern. The first and simplest is, I hope, uncon-
troversial. I call it "anti-sexism." It is the legal equivalent of the
Hippocratic Oath, i.e., first, do no harm. Gratuitous sexist and
racist comments and stereotypes have no place in a law school
classroom. Sexism is only one aspect of a larger problem in law
schools and other institutions. There obviously are similar and
interrelated problems with regard to race, class, and sexual pref-
erence. The law tends to be based on an assumption that the people
who are talking, and the people they are talking to, and the people
they are talking about, are white, male, middle class heterosexuals-
as if it were all George Bush talking to Dan Quayle. We must
remember that, in the world as a whole, those people are a very
small minority, though with more power than is good for them-=
or for the rest of us.
I am going to talk today about gender. As you think about
today's symposium, you can and should translate it into concern
with all of the other differences. As I said, the first focus is anti-
sexism (or anti-racism or anti-classism). The second level is what I
call gender awareness. Issues of relevance and concern to gender
should be included in the curriculum, and I am going to suggest
how we can do this without trenching on other legitimate curricular
concerns.
Finally, I will speak a little about what has become the "F"
word of this decade: Feminism. Even if we call a judge "she" half
the time, and avoid making comments in class about women buying
hats to make themselves feel better, that's not enough. Even if we
include issues of rape and marital property and interspousal tort
immunity in our regular curriculum, law school teaching will still
be male. Feminist scholars have begun to explore how men have
certain styles of teaching and practicing the law-what has been
called the Professor Kingsfield model-and how this style can be
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harmful to women and other living things.' After I have suggested
the sort of minimal anti-sexism and gender awareness that I think
we can demand, I want to go beyond that to explore how a feminist
approach to teaching, across a range of topics, can benefit all
students.
II. CASEBOOKS AND CURRICULUM
A. Gender Sensitivity in Choosing A Casebook
In teaching a substantive law course, probably the most im-
portant single decision a professor makes is choosing the casebook.
As a matter of efficiency, most of us have used and will continue
to use casebooks in our substantive courses. Being anti-sexist,
gender aware, and feminist in the classroom is much easier if the
casebook reinforces those positions. 2 So when you choose a case-
book, you want to look at the options and think, "How does this
book treat women and women's issues?"
Typically, there are relatively few women featured in the cases
selected. The one exception is family law: whatever the gender of
the lawyers, the parties here tend to split evenly along gender lines.
In other courses, however, most of the cases are all about men.
Often, when women do appear as protagonists, they are selfish or
stupid or silly. As Mary Joe Frug has pointed out, when women
are rarely portrayed, the reader may exaggerate the significance of
the few cases presented.3
Second, what roles do the women in the cases play as legal
professionals? How easily could a student conclude after going
through this casebook that all the judges in the world are men?
Apparently-and appallingly-this might be an accurate perception
in southern Illinois, but in the country as a whole there are now
a significant number of women on the federal bench (thanks largely
to President Carter) and on some of the state supreme courts.
Depending on the topic of a casebook, it might readily include
1. Cf Hantzis, Kingsfield and Kennedy, Reappraising the Male Models of Law School
Teaching, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 155 (1988).
2. Most current casebooks avoid gratuitous sexism. See, e.g., Tobias, Gender Issues and the
Prosser, Wade and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GoLDmE GATE U.L. REV. 495 (1988). Unfortu-
nately, even this minimal criterion is not universally met. Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A
Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL Enuc. 117 (1988).
3. Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Aimia.
U.L. REv. 1065, 1077 (1985).
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opinions by Justice O'Connor, or by Judges Patricia Wald or Ruth
Bader Ginsberg of the D.C. Circuit, by Ellen Peters of the Con-
necticut Supreme Court, by Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, or by a variety of other women judges. Indeed,
one can scarcely imagine a contemporary constitutional law course
that did not analyze Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, I suspect that women judges tend to be under-
represented in casebooks in part because most of them are new to
the bench and casebook authors also suffer from a kind of inertia.
There is a canon of famous cases that authors may feel they have
to include, even though they could readily be replaced by newer
cases written by women.4 Furthermore, even if these authors bring
women into the casebook as judges, very often the case will say,
"opinion by O'Connor, J." or "Peters, J." The students may very
well not realize that there is a skirt beneath those black robes
unless the professor points it out.
Whatever the institutional limits to the treatment of women in
the excerpted cases, we can be more demanding as to their treatment
in the author's notes and hypotheticals. In a hypothetical, a judge
or a lawyer ought to be "she" half of the time.' There is no reason
not to do this. Now, some people are going to go, "aha-typical
feminist nitpicking." They will think, "Come on, 'he' is a pronoun
that covers both men and women, and I don't see why you women
get so upset about it." I disagree; the word "he" does not refer
to some sexless pod person-it refers to a man. The reason that a
lot of people find it distracting when you use the word "she" is
precisely because the image inside their head is male. We will no
longer need to worry about the gender of pronouns only at the
time when they are, naturally, no longer always "he." In fact, I
would go further. I suggest to professors that, when you are using
a casebook and there is a case in it by "Smith, J." and you don't
4. I do not suggest that law can be learned without a sense of its history; some older cases
are crucial. But the determination of which cases, past or present, are crucial to understanding a
subject matter is not fixed, but chosen by us in accordance with contemporary criteria of
significance, as historians themselves recognize. If a case should not be law merely because it was
so pronounced in the time of Henry IV, it should not claim a place in the casebook merely
because it has done so since the time of Christopher Columbus Langdell. (Editor's note: This
footnote was added after the symposium in response to Professor Schroeder's remarks, infra page
524).
5. Joshua Dressler, for example, consciously adopts a policy of alternating by chapter between




know who "Smith, J." is, refer to half of the "Smith, J's." as
"she." It is OK if sometimes Felix Frankfurter becomes Felice
Frankfurter.
B. Covering Issues of Concern to Women
In almost any basic course, there are a range of issues that
are of particular interest and concern to women. In a torts course,
these might include interspousal tort immunity and recovery for
emotional distress. In contracts, you could look at surrogacy con-
tracts and prenuptial agreements; in property law, at married
women's property rights or property rights in reproductive material;
in criminal law, at spouse battering or rape. Many of those issues
are important in their own right and they should be covered simply
for that reason; but casebooks often ignore them or treat them as
filler.
When we exclude women's issues from the basic courses, and
confine them to our courses in Family Law, or Women in the Law,
or- Employment Discrimination, that is not a neutral policy. It is
absurd to think that the existing choice of materials in basic
casebooks and course coverage is a "natural" choice, determined
by some ineffable brooding omnipresence of, for example, contract
law. Every decision is a choice to include and to exclude. I want
to present here a set of arguments for including more women-
oriented material than is presently done-or at least being conscious
and political in defending any other set of choices.
The existing organization says to students that "women's is-
sues" are not important enough to count in the real, hardcore
first-year courses. This has two effects. First, gender-sophisticated
students, who were already aware of some of these issues, are
placed in a dilemma. They are told, in effect, that something they
thought was interesting or important, really is not. It is too friv-
olous to include in a "real" law course. Second, those students
who did not know about these issues before will remain ignorant.
This ignorance will make them less skilled, less sophisticated ad-
vocates for women clients, indeed, for any client who has a gender.
6
Furthermore, including issues of interest to women does not
have to interfere with other pedagogical concerns, including that
dreaded monster "coverage." (Students will notice the effects of
6. See Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
101 (1988).
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the coverage monster shortly before the end of the semester when
some professors swell daily assignments in a mad attempt to com-
plete the syllabus.) First year courses, however, have significant
flexibility, because the first year is not primarily about learning a
set of rules or doctrines, but about creating opportunities to study
the styles of legal argument, to trace the effects of doctrinal change
over history, and to learn to perceive and manipulate the gaps and
inconsistencies in legal rules. You can do that with a wide range
of legal material. Let me give you a couple of quick examples of
how women's legal issues can be used to examine general legal
doctrines and concepts.
In criminal law, there is a continuing underlying question
regarding the application of objective versus subjective standards
to defendants' conduct. One area in particular where this comes
up is self-defense. The black letter rule is that you are entitled to
use deadly force only if it "reasonably appears necessary to prevent
immediate death or serious injury." '7 What that phrase means, of
course, requires further analysis. One wonderful case for doing
that analysis is State v. Wanrow.8 The defendant in Wanrow was
a woman. She was in a house with a number of other people who
came together because a man in the neighborhood (who apparently
had sexually molested a neighbor's child at an earlier time) had
that day attacked one of the children who lived in the house. The
feared molester came to the door. Ms. Wanrow somehow found
herself between him and the front door, blocked off from the rest
of the house. He was more than six feet tall and visibly intoxicated.
She was five feet, four inches tall and on crutches. She felt
threatened, took out a gun, shot, and killed him. Was her behavior
reasonable? Would a reasonable person think she (or he?) needed
to shoot to avoid death or serious bodily harm? After all, he wasn't
armed. She had friends in the house. A jury found her guilty. The
Washington Supreme Court said that you need to take a broader
view of what reasonable means. You have to look at the context
in which events happened, not just at the facts at the moment she
killed him, but at what she already knew. The court also said that
the standard jury instruction on self-defense, which referred to the
defendant as "he," did not fit the facts of this case. She wasn't
a "he." She was a "she," and what looks reasonable to a she
may be different from what looks reasonable to a he. When you
7. A. LoEwY, CEmaAL LAW IN A NutrsmEi 67 (1987).
8. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
[Vol. 14
Non-Sexist Teaching Techniques
say "he," you evoke an image of self-defense akin to a school
yard or barroom brawl between two men. It doesn't fit the facts
of this case. Wanrow allows a professor to examine the underlying
concepts of subjective and objective reasonableness in a context
that also encourages students to think about gender assumptions
in legal rules.
I will give you another example from your contracts course.
The old contracts action of breach of promise to marry would
provide a wonderful teaching vehicle for a variety of contract
doctrines. I admit it is not something which is currently in use and
you are not going to find examples in the local newspaper. But,
as much of property law makes evident, the law and even the
subset in the casebook does not limit itself to things of obvious
contemporary relevance.
Breach of promise was an action that was almost always
brought by a woman against a man. In essence, the plaintiff said:
you promised to marry me; you broke the engagement; pay me
damages. The cases and commentaries about breach of promise
raise a number of wonderful legal issues. For example, the cause
of action was not subject to the Statute of Frauds. Much to
commentators' dismay, engagements were "proven" by inference
from such evidence as love letters, gifts that he had given her, or
sexual liberties she had permitted him to take. The material is a
wonderful vehicle for examining more generally the kinds of evi-
dence one can use to prove an agreement and the underlying dispute
over the need for written contracts and the effect of oral agree-
ments. Consider also that the defendant was allowed to break off
the engagement without being liable for certain reasons, like the
fact that the plaintiff was unchaste. But he was not allowed to
break it off simply because he discovered that they hated each
other. This is a wonderful opportunity to examine which terms are
essential to a contract and the relative roles of the parties and the
background legal regime in answering that question. Finally, you
could use breach of promise law to examine the issue of damages.
The cause of action, which flourished in the 19th and early 20th
centuries, was in theory a contract action. Yet it allowed damages
for humiliation and mental suffering, which sounds like tort, as
well as normal contract damages for the value of the lost marriage.
The cases and the criticism of them for blending what were seen
as two entirely different legal regimes, 9 can provide a springboard
9. Indeed, critics of the cause of action found both kinds of damages inherently excessive
1990]
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for analyzing why we have different damages for contract and for
tort, and what led to the contemporary collapse of tort into
contract, or contract into tort.10 (I don't teach that, so I can never
remember which one collapsed into which.) At the same time, any
analysis of breach of promise almost surely will induce students to
think about the economics underlying the institution of marriage
and about changing gender roles."
There are enough opportunities to include women's issues in
the basic casebooks as vehicles for teaching legal rules and
techniques 2 that the burden of justification should shift to those
who would exclude them. When gender awareness is essentially
costless, its absence in effect, if not in intent, is sexism.
C. Looking For More Than Just Cases in a Casebook
As Professor Abrams suggested, casebooks in a standard sub-
stantive course are associated with a style of teaching and a style
of law which privileges appellate cases over other sources of infor-
mation about law and jurisprudence. They reflect the vision of law
as an abstract and formal enterprise, derivable entirely within the
closed universe of legal materials, and a notion that being a lawyer
is merely being skilled at manipulating those materials. Feminists
and other critics, such as legal realists and critical legal scholars,' 3
have noticed how narrow and distorted this vision is and proposed
and inappropriate. See, e.g., Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. PA. L. Rav. 474 (1929);
Wright, Action for the Breach of a Marriage Promise, 10 VA. L. Rav. 361 (1924).
10. See G. Gn.moR, D.AT OF Co~rRAcT (1978).
11. See Coombs, Agency and Partnership, 2 YALE J. oF L. & F)MINsm 1 (1990).
12. There are numerous other examples I could have used. For instance, casebooks could
examine the meaning of cognizable harm through selections from tort cases brought by DES
daughters. See Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1
Y.ALE J. or L. AND FmNtsm 41 (1988); Bender, A Lawyers' Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort,
38 J. LEoA EDUC. 3 (1988). They could use a case like McDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 47 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985) (alleging company's failure to warn consumers of contraceptive
pills about the dangers) to refine the meaning of informed consent. See Finley, supra at 69. They
could use cases of homicide by battered women to examine the tension between objective and
subjective visions in self-defense doctrine. They could use coverture and the development of trust
law to consider the role and impact of legal fictions.
13. Feminist legal scholars such as Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Leslie Bender have drawn on
materials in feminism generally in developing a critique of traditional legal education. Much,
though not all, of this analysis has been developed by some of the realists and post-realists,
especially critical legal studies adherents, as well. See, e.g., Kennedy, Legal Education and the
Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEAL EDUC. 591 (1982); Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L.
Ray. 915 (1988). For a feminist critique of some aspects of the critical legal studies counter-model,
see Hantzis, supra note 1.
[Vol. 14
Non-Sexist Teaching Techniques
that we need to bring more than just law into our legal education
and our jurisprudence. We need awareness of facts and how to
discover and present them. We need the tools of history, economics,
psychology and sociology.
Even if casebooks and the case method are, on the whole,
clumsy tools for transforming legal education, they are not uni-
formly problematic. Some casebooks are better than others. For
example, some casebooks provide more facts of the excerpted cases.
Any sensitive and deep understanding of the law requires having a
thick context, making a serious attempt to know what actually
happened. There are good reasons we do not teach from the little
squibs of legal doctrine in those "study aids" that too many
students love. Indeed, a good casebook should sometimes go be-
yond the case itself to explain What happened in the opinion below
or even in those facts not preserved by any West reporter. Students
often want to know, "So what happened next? What did they
do?" In one casebook that I am aware of, the author actually
went out and called up the lawyers, asked those questions, and put
the answers in the casebook. Interestingly, it is a woman's case-
book, on a "woman's topic"-Judith Areen's Family Law.' 4
'A feminist casebook will make an effort to provide a broader
factual background for legal issues." It may include commentary,
both legal and non-legal, government statistical reports, even pop-
ular press clippings to give more sense of the context out of which
cases arise. For example, the constitutional law casebook by Stone,
Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet'" uses cases challenging the Social
Security system as gender-biased as a major portion of its section
on gender -discrimination. In her review of that book,' 7 Professor
Mary Becker-points out that, without a general explanation of how
the Social Security system operates, a student could come away
thinking that these judicial decisions have created real equality in
the system. These cases operate, however, on the fringes of the
Social Security system; its basic structure is designed so that the
average woman gets only a fraction of what the average man
receives. You would never know that from the materials in the
casebook.
14. J. AREEN, CASES AND MATmuAmS ON FAmn.y LAw (2d ed. 1985).
15. A good example of such contextualizing material comprises the first part of the chapter
on rape in L. WEmi, CRmAi. LAw: CAsEs, ComENcr, QUEsTIoNs (4th ed. 1986).
16. G. SmE, L. SEmAN, C. Sut smmI & M. Tus5NET, CoNnTrur'noNAL LAW (1986).
17. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle; Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman,
Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 CoLum. L. Ray. 264 (1989).
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Let's assume you are a good, well-intentioned professor and
you are trying to consider anti-sexism, gender awareness, and
feminism when choosing a casebook. Unfortunately, there is no
general Consumer's Guide to Non-Gender-Biased Casebooks. There
are a few studies of particular casebooks and particular areas; s
otherwise, you are pretty much on your own.
Is it worth the effort to add these criteria to the complex task
of choosing the most suitable book? I believe so. As we choose
books that are less sexist, that are more gender aware, that are
more feminist, the landscape itself will change. Remember the
invisible hand of the market? Our efforts needn't be entirely
economic and invisible. We can write to authors and publishers
and tell them, "This is why I liked your casebook, and this is why
I chose it." And sometimes, we can write to them to say, "This
is why I didn't like your casebook, and this is why I didn't choose
it.,19
III. SUPPLEMENTATION AND CLASSROOM DEMEANOR
Even with the best intentions, you can't alway find a suitable
casebook. It is sort of like having to go shopping for vegetables
on late Sunday afternoon-all the available choices are a bit limp
and brown around the edges. What do you do then if you're a
good-hearted professor?
First, if the problem is a lack of gender awareness, you could
use supplementary materials. For example, I used a criminal law
casebook that had nothing about the problem of spousal violence
except some self-defense cases involving battered women who even-
tually killed their batterers. I thought it was important for the
students to have some insight into how the law handles battering
generally.20 I prepared a set of supplementary readings. It began
18. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 3; Finley, supra note 12; Women in Legal Education -
Pedagogy, Law, Theory and Practice, 38 J. LEoA. EDUC. 1 (1988) (a collection of articles on
women in legal education); and sources cited in Erickson, supra note 6, (including her own criminal
law project). For several years, the annual AALS meeting included programs by the Women in
Law Project (coordinated by Professor Ann Shalleck) and by the Women in Legal Education
Section jointly with various other sections such as property, torts, and criminal law, dealing with
issues of gender and legal education.
19. We can also make our concerns felt collectively. See Coombs, supra note 2.
20. This need not be included in a criminal law course. However, the fact that we use the
police as our agents of social control, and the ability to contrast the treatment of assault in non-
domestic contexts makes this one place where the issue could appropriately be discussed. As
indicated earlier, to relegate all issues involving women and family to the family law course
reinforces a false vision of these issues as separate and subsidiary. (Editor's note: This footnote
was added after the symposium in response to Professor Schroeder's remarks, infra page 524).
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with an article from the early seventies which recommended that
the police separate the squabbling spouses, since domestic violence
wasn't really a criminal matter. 2' The packet also included a more
recent article which documented the effects of arrest, 22 a case
involving an equal-protection challenge to police refusal to respond
to domestic violence calls, 23 and the Florida form that police are
now required to fill out every time they make a domestic violence
call. With these materials, I could lead a discussion about the
possibilities and limitations of police intervention in domestic as-
saults.
That kind of supplementation helps, but has its own problems.
Students are likely to view what is in the casebook as real and
what is in the professor's supplement as a form of self-indulgence:
"Well, now she's doing her feminist shtick, you know, so we'll all
put our pens down and not worry about it." This image of women's
issues as extraneous is especially problematic if the issues are
presented as a special unit. You should try to make sure that, even
if women's materials are physically ghettoized in the supplemental
readings, they aren't temporally ghettoized.
Supplements can mitigate problems of gender awareness. How
do we counter sexism in a casebook, such as misogynous images
of women, stereotypes, or problems in pronouns? It may seem
tempting to ignore the problem and just run your class in a non-
sexist fashion. The difficulty is that a casebook has apparent power
and authority simply because you chose it and because it is printed
text. I think the better approach is to confront distortions in a
casebook as they arise. We don't hesitate to teach "against the
text" in regard to its substantive materials, and I think we can
also teach against the text in regard to its sexism, or its racism, or
its classism. Casebooks, like judges and professors, can sometimes
provide us with negative examples.
If the faculty in the audience were all perfect, I could move
on right now to the topic of feminist teaching modes. But, unfor-
tunately, I suspect that not all my colleagues, here or elsewhere,
will accept my suggestions. Even those who try to be anti-sexist or
21. Parnas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-Family Violence, 36 LAw
A CoNT~mp. PRons. 539 (1971).
22. Comment, Immediate Arrest in Domestic Violence Situations: Mandate or Alternative, 14
CA'. U.L. Rav. 243 (1985).
23. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) or Sorichetti v. City
of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985).
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gender-aware are going to fail sometimes-I've used more than my
share of presumptively male pronouns. So, as students, what can
you do when the person in front of the room is less than perfectly
empathetic, less than perfectly brave, maybe even perfectly piggish?
I suggest that your response should largely depend on whether you
think the lapse is one of judgment or of character. What if you
are not sure? My strategy in similar situations is to assume good-
will and a temporary lapse of judgment until I am faced with
evidence to the contrary. I think a. part of the reason Ghandi and
Martin Luther King succeeded was because they acted as if everyone
would* respond to moral claims. In doing so, they sometimes
induced their opponents into behaving better. For example, let's
assume there is some gratuitous sexism or racism in your text and
the teacher seems oblivious to it. I think, as long as the presumption
of good-will is operating, you should try to bring it to the attention
of the. professor in a way that is not going to create public
embarrassment or defensiveness. Nobody likes to be put on the
spot. You can raise the issue privately, or you can do so in a way
that is gentle and non-confrontational. For example, I was in one
class where a professor consistently referred to a hypothetical judge
or lawyer as "he" and I watched the students, when they re-
sponded, just refer to the same person as "she." The message was
clear.
Those sort of gentle, polite approaches are not always effective.
If they don't work, you have three options. First, you could accept
the temptings of inertia, write off the class or the field as sexist
and keep quiet. Sometimes, we lack the courage or the energy for
one more struggle. If you are a little braver, you can call on higher
authority. Go to somebody else who you think has some influence
and talk to them about it. Finally, I think you can at least make
your feelings clear outside of class. More often than you may
recognize, your complaints can reduce or eliminate the perceived
legitimacy of the sexism or racism in the eyes of your fellow
students.
Failures in coverage, however, are difficult for you as students
to combat, because you are frequently not going to be aware of
them. It is similar to reading an appellate opinion-it seems quite
logical until you read the dissent, where you discover the facts that
got left out of the majority opinion. Sometimes, if you are fairly
sophisticated in a certain gender area, you may realize that there
are gaps in class coverage. Again, begin by assuming good will.
You may solve the problem simply by bringing it to the professor's
[Vol.. 14
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attention. If the teacher is unresponsive, you can provide alternative
channels of learning, like this symposium. You can set up little
study groups, with professors or on your own, or arrange for guest
lecturers from academia or practice. Remember that the learning
experience in law school is not just what happens in the classroom.
There are many ways to provide alternative fora for educating
yourselves and others.
IV. THE FEMINIST PROFESSOR
So far I have been talking primarily about what a good-hearted
professor-with some gentle prodding from students-can do to
promote anti-sexism and gender awareness. If we consistently achieve
those goals, we have some reason to be pleased. But I am going
to be a little greedy now. I am going to suggest that I would like
to have professors be feminists too. I want to use the example of
teaching rape to explain what that means.
The word "rape"-even in an academic lawyer's context-is
scary. Butterflies start in my stomach whenever I talk publicly
about rape. Such anxieties should not tempt us into leaving it out
of our classes. Admittedly, choices must be made, and some crimes
excluded. When you leave rape out, however, that decision reads
as political; it marginalizes rape and denigrates its significance.
Furthermore, rape is an area where a lot of students come to law
school with prejudices and stereotypes. If these are not confronted,
they will continue to exist. Even an imperfect class on rape can
make our students better lawyers and better citizens.
Rape, like other gender issues, is also a topic through which
we can effectively examine a variety of general legal issues, such
as the role and meaning of consent, and the nature of character
evidence. It is a good vehicle for examining the effects of racism
in the doctrines and practices of the law. Rape law, traditionally,
was formally racist: one statute specifically made rape a capital
crime only if a black male raped a white woman.2 4 Rape law in
practice is still deeply racist (as well as sexist)." Despite its social
significance and pedagogical usefulness, however, rape is not a
central focus of criminal law teaching. The general skittishness can
be seen in the casebooks. Some of them leave rape out altogether,
24. See Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARv. WomEN's L.J. 103, 105 n.8 (1983).
25. Id. See also S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1986); G. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMNAL JUSTICE:
T)KE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1989).
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while many others include only minimal coverage. 26 My admittedly
anecdotal impression is that classroom coverage is even scantier.
Such avoidance may not be altogether bad. If the professor is
going to be really insensitive, you may be better off with nothing
at all, for he or she can do real harm. I have heard stories of truly
appalling things being said in the classroom by the professor.
Almost as bad, I have heard of students making comments, such
as "any woman who really doesn't want it can prevent a rape,"
without the professor immediately condemning the statement. One
of the reasons that sensitivity is crucial becomes apparent from the
statistics on the frequency of rape. In the average law school
classroom, there are going to be women who have been victims of
rape or attempted rape. Perhaps it is even scarier to look at the
statistics and then at our average law school classroom and realize
how likely it is that there will be men who have committed rape
or attempted rape. How are we going to handle teaching rape,
given that?
One option is to go back to the Professor Kingsfield model,
and treat rape cases as pure legal doctrine, ignoring all the factual
contexts. Rape, such an approach seems to say, has nothing to do
with gender, has nothing to do with sex; it is just "law." There
were good reasons, though, for feminist rejection of the Kingsfield
socratic model of teaching, a model that saw law as something
formalistic, distinct from the experiences of people's lives, apart
from politics. That model of law and teaching is a lie. It places
the instructor in the role of the neutral, objective voice of authority,
what is sometimes termed the Male Voice. Hiding inside the cases,
it assumes a pre-existing set of doctrinal principles. You, the
student, can uncover them if you have someone to guide you.
Specifically, it assumes that rape law consists of a set of determi-
nate, objective rules, applying "reasonable man" standards to both
the victim and the perpetrator. Placing the class in such a straight-
jacket ensures that they will never understand what rape is or how
rape law operates in the real world.
26. The pages devoted to rape issues ranged from none to 38 in the first four books on my
shelf: W. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIAiNAl LAW: CASES, COMMENTs AND QUESTIONS (2d ed. 1988)
(none); F. liNAu, A. MoENssENs, AND J. THom'soN, CxwnNAL LAw: CASES AND CommENTs (4th
ed. 1987) (21); P. JOHNSON, CRDmNAL LAw: SuBsTANTrvE CRnIMNAL LAw IN ITS PROCEDURAL
CoNrxT: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT (2d ed. 1980) (38); and P. Low, J.C. JE17ERIES, JR., AND
R. BoNrm, CsvN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d. ed 1986) (none). A striking exception to
the generally thin coverage is L. WESNEEB, supra note 15, which devotes an entire 68-page chapter
to "Law in Social Context: Rape."
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It is not simply that concepts of "consent" and "force" and
"resistance" in rape law prove, on close analysis, to be so multi-
meaninged that the attempt to make them determinate is the intellectual
equivalent of trying to pin Jello to the wall.
The problem with rape law, and the reason that it cannot be
taught effectively in a Male Voice, is itself a problem of gender. Facts
and circumstances that a reasonable woman would view as coercion
or rape, a reasonable man may well view as reluctant consent.27
Typically, men and women have different perspectives. The law,
unfortunately, does not acknowledge those two perspectives equally.
Unless the woman can articulate her version in male terms, it is not
going to be heard by prosecutors, by police, by juries, or by appellate
courts. 28 Good, feminist classroom teaching of rape will expose and
explore those tensions.
How do you teach rape effectively? I think the first thing you
need to do is to make clear that it is not, from the victim's perspective,
about sex but about violation. You need to make sure the students
understand that there are people in the classroom for whom it is more
than an abstract legal concept. You need to do that because at one
level, it is about things like sexuality and gender and that makes many
people nervous. One of the ways that people traditionally deal with
being nervous is to make jokes. These kinds of jokes are simply not
an acceptable part of classroom discourse. Reminding the class that
there are rape victims among them has a significant sobering effect.
The other thing you can do to teach rape effectively is to bring
in experiences outside the casebook to help them understand what the
law is and what the law does. In both her article2 and her book about
rape, 30 Susan Estrich begins with the story of her own rape and then
occasionally refers back to it in criticizing the stereotypes, the judges'
decisions and the scholarship about rape. This practice of using
personal experience, and storytelling, has been used by other feminist
and minority scholars to enrich our legal scholarship." I think that
27. Cf McKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Towards Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 8 SioiNs: J. oF WomEN IN CULTU AND Soc'Y 635 (1983).
28. Estrich, Rape, 95 YA.E L.J. 1087 (1986).
29. Id.
30. S. EsTmcH, supra note 25.
31. See, e.g., Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGzs: J. OF WomEN IN CULTutr
AND Soc'y (1989); MATSUrDA, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
Htv. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987); Lawrence, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAvED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FoR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
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the use of personal stories can enrich the classroom as well. Rape is
an important and appropriate area for doing so. I do not have a
story, thank God, as horrific as Susan Estrich's or those of many
other women, some of them in my classrooms. But I have sometimes
told the story about the time when I sort of consented after a bad
date. I was tired of arguing and embarrassed because I knew I should
not have let the man into my apartment. And in some back part of
my mind I realized that he was six feet, four inches tall and had
talked about a previous college football career. Probably not legally
rape, but a useful story for exploring the effective limits of legal rules.
Sometimes, I get students' stories. They are unbelievably enriching
when they are told. You cannot guarantee that a student will feel safe
enough to tell a personal story. It rarely happens. Treasure it when it
does.
I do not think it is just a coincidence that most of the law
teachers who tell stories, who reject the Male Voice in their teaching
and writing, have been white women and men and women of color.
It may be in part because we have never been able to pull off the
Male Voice very well. It is, then, less of a risk to say, "Look, since
we can't do that, let's try the contextual, the open, the personal."
But we are not going to have that many women in the classroom for
at least the next ten or twenty years. If we accept as a norm, not just
a fact, that feminism is something for women to do, we are not going
to have enough feminist teaching and writing. I am asking for white
male law professors to also be feminists in the classroom. It is, I
recognize, harder for them. They really have the option of the safe,
falsely neutral, authoritative Male Voice. They may have to be a little
braver to give up something that they could do in order to use their
own individual voices. A few of them may be unchangeable; they
have had the male mask on for so long, that there is no face behind
it anymore. Most of them, though, could choose to take the risks of
speaking in their own voices. If they do, there will be not just Male
Voice and women's voices, but men's voices as well.
Am I suggesting that men tell stories from their own experience
in a rape class? Maybe. I remember a story that one man once told
me which would have been incredibly instructive for a class. He talked
of an evening when there was too much liquor all around, and he
sort of suspected the woman he was with wanted to stop, but she
wasn't articulating it very well. As he tells it, part of him wanted to
have sex only if she wanted it or at least he wanted to want it only
under those circumstances, and part of him just wanted it. "It's her
job to tell me 'No'." The way he tells the story, the liquor fortunately
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affected his capacity as well as his desire and he finally left, too
embarrassed ever to see her again. A valuable story for rape class and
one far more powerful told in a man's voice.
Few men would, or could be expected to, tell a story like that in
front of a class. Surely, there are other things that men can do in
order to be feminist teachers. While one's own stories have a peculiar
power, the use of third-person stories can also be very useful in
breaking out of Male Voice. If you are doing a unit on rape, you
could begin by having the students read Susan Estrich's story or
selections from a book called Men on Rape.32 You could, as I did
when I taught the rape unit in Women in the Law, show a segment
of the movie The Accused,33 or use other fictionalized accounts. If
you are teaching a case like Commonwealth v. Sherry,34 a recent and
infamous Boston date-rape case, you could include some of the
newspaper articles that describe what was going on and how people
responded to it. There are a couple of instances in which law professors
have gone back and done a rich, factual, contextual analysis that
makes. the cases come alive. Professor Noonan has done so for
Palsgraf;" and Professor Simpson for Dudley and Stephens,3 6 the
famous case of the cannibals in the lifeboat. Maybe somebody will
provide a similar context for one of the famous (or infamous) rape
cases. There are a wide range of techniques and materials that you
could use to make room in legal education for multiple perspectives
and multiple voices. What we need is the will to do so, fueled by a
thirst for justice and true knowledge. I hope my male colleagues can
do that, so we can all seek for justice together.
Response by William A. Schroeder**
I am sympathetic to, and in general agreement with, much of
what you have said. I see my role here, however, as a respondent; so
I deliberately tried, as you spoke, to pick out some things that I
thought were debatable rather than simply say "good job-you've
made some good points."
32. T. BEa'm , MEN ON RAPE: WHAT THEY HAVE To SAY ABOUT SEXUAL VIOLENCE (1983).
33. The Accused (Paramount 1988).
34. 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E.2d 224 (1982).
35. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (Ct. App. 1928). See J.T.
NooNA, JR., PENso AND MAmsx op im LAw (1976).
36. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (QB Div. 1884).
37. See B. SIBMsoN, CAIaALnsM AND THE CooN LAw (1984).
** Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1969, University
of Illinois; LL.M. 1977, Harvard Law School.
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First, the feminist perspective is certainly one way of approaching
the teaching of law. I am not exactly sure what feminism means,
either in the abstract or when you use that term, but I have no
quarrel with someone presenting materials in the law school classroom
from that perspective or from any other perspective. I think, however,
that when materials are presented from a certain perspective instead
of in a neutral way, the listener should be informed of the presenter's
approach so that he or she can take that perspective into account in
evaluating the presentation.
Secondly, I would like to address the question of gender sensi-
tivity in the classroom and in the selection of cases and materials. I
try to use "she" as well as "he" in the classroom, and in conver-
sations, but I am not entirely sure that it is always appropriate in
every area of criminal law. As you know, the majority of the actors
in the criminal justice system, and the vast majority of the defendants,
are male. It is not clear to me that it is useful to attempt to alter
that reality by referring to half of those defendants as "she."
You suggest substituting more recent cases involving women
judges and litigants for some of the old (albeit classic) cases. That
is almost re-writing history. It is kind of like saying, "We did not
like the Inquisition, it wasn't very nice, so we'll just pretend it didn't
happen." I am not sure what is achieved by that and I think
something, the reality of where we are coming from, is lost. It seems
to me to make more sense to try to focus on and change the future,
rather than to try to change the past.
You mentioned self-defense. It seems to me that the issues you
raise in the context of self-defense apply to both women and men.
There's a whole range of issues involving how a person can respond
to specific types of threats. Is deadly force appropriate only when
there is an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm, or can
the use of deadly force be predicated on something less? Must the
defendant's belief in the necessity of force be objectively or subjec-
tively reasonable? What, if any, duty is there to retreat or otherwise
remove oneself from a threatening or potentially threatening situa-
tion? What kind of past actions on the part of the original assailant
are relevant and what kind of knowledge about that assailant's history
is relevant? Those are issues that affect males as well as females.
Many males are uncomfortable with physical force and physical
confrontation. Moreover, a five-foot, four-inch person threatened by
a six-foot, four-inch drunken assailant who is known, or thought,
to be capable of violence is in a difficult position without respect to
the gender of the actors. This and similar scenarios raise questions
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across the whole spectrum of self-defense law. It is not enough to
simply add a woman's perspective. If there is an argument that there
should be a greater entitlement to self-defense than we have tradi-
tionally allowed, and I think there is, that argument reaches across
a broad range of settings.
You mentioned domestic violence. I have read a lot recently that
suggests that this is a very common thing. And the victim is not
always a woman. Perhaps it would be useful to add a component
on domestic violence to the basic criminal law course. Doing so,
however, suggests that the criminal justice system is the proper forum
for dealing with this problem. I am not sure it is. Every social
problem cannot be solved through the criminal justice system. I have
seen figures that suggest that violence occurs in half of all relation-
ships. The criminal justice system is ill-equipped to handle a problem
of this magnitude. Moreover, the tools available to that system may
not be suited to this problem. For example, traditionally the police
did not make arrests in domestic violence cases. Changing that policy
and requiring that the police must make arrests in response to every
complaint of domestic violence may have some adverse consequences.
Arrest is a serious thing and it is something that happens at a time
when the arrestee is still presumed innocent. An arrestee who is taken
to jail, and most are, may be held under deplorable conditions. An
arrestee may lose time from work and may even lose his job. Most
arrestees, though, are soon released and when they are, they usually
return to the same home, with the same complaining witness, as
before. Often the complaining witness drops the charges. Even when
there is a prosecution, the penalty is rarely substantial. But the effect
of having an arrest record is that the arrestee may have difficulty
getting a job in the future because of that record. Joblessness may
exacerbate the problems that led to violence in the first place. Perhaps
a better solution, instead of automatic arrest, would be to automat-
ically order the offender out of the home for a time-say sixty days.
My purpose here is not to sell any particular alternative to the
criminal justice system. My point is simply that if domestic violence
is added to the criminal law course, it should be presented in a way
that includes all aspects of the problem and that looks at alternatives
beyond the criminal justice system. Perhaps the subject of domestic
violence is more appropriate for a family law course, but wherever
it is presented, it should be done in a neutral, broad-based way.
I would say somewhat the same thing in presenting rape as an
issue. I realize that many criminal law casebooks do not include any
materials on rape. I think that is unfortunate, because it should be
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included in the basic criminal law course. Obviously though, rape is
not the only crime there is. I was a prosecutor for a while and in
our office maybe one or two percent of the prosecutions were for
rape. I realize many rapes are not reported, but still, I dorilt think
you would want a criminal law course that focuses disproportionately
on rape. So I am not sure exactly what you are arguing for. If you
are saying only that we should include rape in the criminal law
course as a crime which should be discussed, I would agree. If you
are saying that students should be taught that the way in which the
law treats that crime is a manifestation of male dominance in society,
I think you would want to insure that any other relevant perspectives
are also presented. If you are arguing more broadly that the whole
legal structure was created by males and reflects that fact, I wonder
if that perspective could be better presented in a jurisprudence course.
I agree that there are a lot of issues that can be raised in the
context of rape law. You mentioned some, racism and sexism, but
there are also evidentiary issues, issues of intent, issues about the
reality of the criminal process, and others. It seems to me that it is
important to address the reality of the criminal process. Not every
witness is motivated solely by the desire to tell the truth. Not every
factfinder can distinguish truthful testimony from untruthful testi-
mony. Not every trial results in the "guilty" being found "guilty"
and in the "not guilty" being found "not guilty.' Those things
could, and should, be raised.
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